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Applying selected concepts of organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident of 
1975 leads to a more comprehensive understanding of events and more accurate lessons 
learned.  Application of organizational theory demonstrates the decision processes at the 
executive level left the military operation vulnerable to failure.  Henry Mintzberg’s 
structural contingency model and Lee Bowman and Terrence Deal’s frames model within 
organizational theory are used and are applied to executive-level decisions.  The rationale 
behind focusing on the executive level is twofold: First, it is where final critical decisions 
were made, and second, military operations cannot take place without an executive-level 
authorization.  The Mayaguez crisis was rife with potential pitfalls and, though President 
Ford was equipped with an excellent organization of intelligent, competent personnel, the 
result was unnecessary loss of life.  Publicly, the operation was a success and President 
Ford the savior of the Mayaguez crew.  To the military, the operation was an 
embarrassment—all because of failures within the organizational structure and poor 
decision making. Application of organizational theory provides an avenue for analysis of 
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On 12 May 1975, an American merchant ship, SS Mayaguez, was seized by the 
Cambodian government in what President Gerald Ford believed was a threatening show 
of force by the relatively new Khmer Rouge government.  The United States government 
responded swiftly by sending a full military package to rescue the Mayaguez and her 
crew.  In the end, President Ford publicly declared the operation a success, but for the 
military, it was an abysmal failure.  A full report was produced to summarize the events.  
After reviewing the report, Congress requested, and the Government Accounting Office 
(GAO) conducted, an investigation to clarify incongruous statements and events listed in 
the incident report. 
This thesis is based on the hypothesis that by applying selected concepts of 
organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident of 1975, one can gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of events and more accurate lessons learned.  Specifically, 
application of organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident demonstrates that the 
decision processes at the executive level left the military operation vulnerable to failure.  
To conduct this analysis, the authors used Henry Mintzberg’s structural contingency 
model and Lee Bowman and Terrence Deal’s frames of reference model within 
organizational theory.  In particular, the models are applied to the highest levels of the 
National Command Authority and Department of Defense organizations, focusing on the 
executive-level decisions rather than the entire structure itself.  This thesis defines the 
executive level during the Mayaguez incident as the National Security Council principal 
members: president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense.  The rationale behind 
focusing on the executive level is twofold: First, it is where final critical decisions were 
(and still are) made, and second, military operations did not and cannot take place 
without an executive-level decision.   
 
A. PURPOSE: 
The purpose of this thesis is to reexamine the events and published lessons 
learned of 12–15 May 1975 through the lenses of organizational theory.  Because there is 
 2
no single, cohesive organizational theory per se, the task of examining organizations 
becomes complicated, requiring integration of a web of different theories and approaches.  
However, by combining select theories within a larger frame of reference model, a 
clearer picture of the organization, actors, and its effectiveness is obtained. Applying 
organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident demonstrates that decision processes at 
the executive level made the military operation vulnerable to failure.   
Although the Government Accounting Office (GAO) published a full report of the 
Mayaguez incident, it was both incomplete and inaccurate in terms of analysis.  The 
report merely consolidated information from various sources within the government, to 
include the military, rather than applying analysis to the events themselves.  
Unfortunately for the military, the GAO report was, and still is, the only source of 
information for lessons learned.  Since inaccurate or incomplete, the lessons derived from 
the information presented left the military vulnerable to committing the same mistakes in 
future operations.  If an analysis of the errors made in the planning and execution of the 
Mayaguez incident resulted in a more comprehensive review of the organization as well 
as its actions, perhaps subsequent missions such as the hostage rescue attempt in Iran—
Operation EAGLE CLAW, or more commonly, Desert One—would not have failed.  
While the GAO report reviews events that were not executed as planned, it fails to 
analyze or explain shortcomings within the organization itself that also attributed or were 
causal to the mistakes made.  The report seems to only assign blame to individuals rather 
than examine failed processes, structures, and systems; it actually misses the analytical 
process altogether.  In fact, nothing was stated about the failures of the organization 
except in the case of failed communications.  In the absence of analysis, the 
recommendations for correcting the problems are then flawed.     
For an organization to operate efficiently and effectively, careful attention must 
be paid to every aspect of the organization, its environment, and the mission it intends to 
accomplish.  Several methods could be used to analyze the Mayaguez incident, but 
perhaps the most telling is that of organizational theory.  In this thesis, the focus is on the 
executive level.  Applying organizational theory to the executive decision makers  
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involved in the Mayaguez incident reveals that the decision processes of the 
individuals—specifically President Ford—were flawed, causing the entire military 
operation to fail.   
 
B. BACKGROUND 
The following chapter is an adaptation from Dr. John Guilmartin’s book, A Very 
Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang.  Although other sources were 
consulted and are available on the subject, Dr. Guilmartin’s book appeared to be the most 
succinct and accurate account of the events that transpired.  He is recognized as the 
foremost authority on the Mayaguez incident not only because he researched and 
authored his book, but also because he piloted one of the helicopters during the operation, 
thus enabling firsthand accounts of the action. 
On 12 May 1975, two weeks after the fall of Saigon, Cambodia’s Navy seized the 
U.S.-owned container ship SS Mayaguez, along with its crew.  The intentions of the 
Cambodian government were unknown when the ship was seized, largely because 
leadership in Washington, D.C., did not recognize and would not communicate with the 
new Cambodian government, comprised of the Khmer Rouge.  President Gerald Ford 
quickly came under intense pressure to recover the crew and ship.  In 1968, North Korea 
seized the USS Pueblo, resulting in eleven months of captivity of the crew and 
embarrassment to the United States. With this event in mind, President Ford acted 
decisively to recover the Mayaguez and crew. What should have been an easy operation 
against a small, unorganized and officially unrecognized country was anything but. 
The United States, having recalled forces after the Vietnam conflict, still had 
sufficient airpower based at U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Base, Thailand, to launch an 
operation, but needed a ground force to aid in the recovery of the Mayaguez crew.  
Unfortunately, ground troops were stationed elsewhere; some of them still exiting 
Vietnam, some in Thailand, and some in Okinawa, Japan.  The president requested troops 
to meet the strict timeline he imposed for recovery of the Mayaguez and crew, going as 
far as to return troops who had just left the battlefields of Vietnam.  Late that night, on 
the evening of May 12, 1975, the Mayaguez was located, anchored off of Koh Tang 
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Island in the Gulf of Siam.  Based on the assumption the crew was on the island, the 
command structure planned the operation as a rescue of the Mayaguez crew and recapture 
of the ship as United States’ sovereign property.  The Marines would deploy to U-Tapao 
and board Air Force special-operations and rescue CH/HH-53s based in Thailand to take 
the beach at Koh Tang Island on May 15, 1975.  The military also was tasked to 
recapture the actual ship, SS Mayaguez.  This would be the Air Force’s first helicopter 
assault operation.1  After recovery of the crew, the helicopters would transport the crew 
to the aviation-ready frigate USS Henry Holt, already in seas nearby.   
Unbeknownst to the Marine forces and Air Force crews, the island harbored an 
estimated 100–300 armed, combat-hardened Khmer Rouge forces placed there to protect 
Koh Tang from occupation by Vietnam.  An old political dispute over sovereign rights to 
Koh Tang Island had escalated between Cambodia and Vietnam in recent months, 
causing the Cambodians to station combat-ready troops and weaponry on the island.  
Because diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam were strained and 
diplomacy with the Cambodians was virtually non-existent, the United States government 
failed to accurately assess the island’s inhabitants and importance to the region.  Instead, 
the intelligence community estimated a total of only 18 to 40 persons on Koh Tang 
Island, including both the lightly armed militia and indigenous population.  This would 
be only one of many major mistakes made in the Mayaguez incident. 
On the approach to the island, the Air Force helicopter crews were the first to 
suffer the consequences of previous intelligence and diplomatic failures as the Khmer 
Rouge shot down three of the first four helicopters approaching the island.  Intelligence 
was both inadequate and unavailable for the mission and diplomatic efforts, notably 
limited in nature, had failed to secure the release of the Mayaguez and crew.  
Unfortunately for the operation, the second helicopter carried the Marine Forward Air 
Controller (FAC) team, and the fourth helicopter was so badly damaged it had to abort 
and return to U-Tapao.  Eventually, Marines were inserted successfully via other 
helicopters.  Regrettably, the Air Force A-7s failed to locate the Marines, leaving them 
                                                 
1 The previous assaults done with Special Operations Forces, e.g. Son Tay, were still classified at the 
time of the Mayaguez Operation.   
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without fire support.  The Marines continued to fight valiantly as they waited for the 
remaining helicopters to fly through enemy fire to deliver reinforcements, their 
motivation waning from the offensive beach assault to mere survival.  Unfortunately, the 
enemy continued to fire on and destroy most of the remaining helicopters leaving the 
Marines with few options to return.  In fact, only three of the helicopters that landed in U-
Tapao would be able to continue and return to Koh Tang to recover the ground forces.   
Finally, with the assault still waging, a Marine boarding party brought in by Air 
Force helicopters embarked the Mayaguez expecting to find the ship under siege.  To the 
contrary, the ship was deserted because the Khmer Rouge had taken the Mayaguez crew 
to the Cambodian mainland two days earlier.  President Ford ordered air strikes on the 
Cambodian port and vessels in the surrounding waters to protect the military forces and 
preclude the SS Mayaguez from being taken to the mainland.  Unbeknownst to the 
military forces involved in the operations, the Khmer Rouge were constantly moving the 
crew during the operation not as a practice of deception but merely to get the crew to a 
location suitable for release. 
The reason behind moving the Mayaguez crew is unclear.  It is possible the 
Khmer Rouge did not want to complicate the dispute with Vietnam over the island by 
involving the United States, or it may be that the U.S.’ retaliatory strikes on the 
Cambodian mainland influenced the Khmer Rouge.  Regardless of the reason, the Khmer 
Rouge released the crew, sending them out to sea in a Thai fishing boat.  Fortunately, the 
USS Henry G. Wilson had just arrived in the area and was able to recover the Mayaguez 
crew after spotting Caucasians waving white flags on the deck of a Thai fishing vessel.2  
The recovery of the Mayaguez crew resulted in a Presidential order to cease assault 
operations on Koh Tang Island, saving a second wave of Marines from possible fatalities 
as the Khmer Rouge were far more prepared than our fighting forces.   
After the Mayaguez crew was recovered, the assault operation was transformed 
into a rescue operation to extract the remaining Marines off the island.  An AC-130 
Spectre Gunship provided firepower while an air-rescue HH-53 Jolly Green and two OV-
                                                 
2 Commander in Chief Pacific Command.  The SS Mayaguez Incident. Command History Branch, 
Office of the Joint Secretary, Appendix VI.  San Francisco, CA. 1976.   
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10 Forward Air Controllers (FACs) coordinated in the air to save the remaining Marines.  
It was the FACs, and not the chain of command, that initiated the rescue of the battered 
Marines.  When the rescue operations began, night already had fallen, but the Khmer 
Rouge had not relented with its assault against U.S. forces.  Despite only four HH-53s 
being flight capable, the rescue force launched to recover the Marines.  Of course, within 
seconds of approach to the island, all HH-53s were fired upon, rendering one of them 
unable to complete the mission.  As the night progressed, one more helicopter was able to 
return to the rescue operation, achieving only marginal success. 
At the end of the night, as the last helicopter approached, the ground commander 
was asked to take a final head count of his Marines to ensure it would be the helicopter’s 
last run and no one would be left behind.  The commander concluded all Marines were 
accounted for and the helicopter extracted the Marines to the USS Holt.  Once aboard the 
Holt, a final headcount was taken and the mood drastically soured with the news: E 
Company was missing three Marines.  Those Marines were declared as Killed in Action 
(KIA) by the United States government who stands by its declaration even today.  
However, recently uncovered eye-witness accounts and interviews of the soldiers on the 
beach revealed the Marines were, in fact, left behind fighting for their lives.3 
In the GAO report of the Mayaguez incident as well as President Ford’s 
assessment, the mission was considered a success despite the contrary opinion of those 
involved in the operation below the executive level.  Military losses went largely 
unnoticed with the announcement of the successful recovery of the SS Mayaguez and her 
crew by President Ford.  Forty-one military men lost their lives attempting to save the SS 
Mayaguez and her 39 crewmembers.  Unknown to the president and cabinet, and before 
the first shot was fired on Koh Tang Island, the Mayaguez crew had been released to a 
Thai fishing vessel.  The entire beach assault was executed needlessly.  Row Rowan, in 
The Four Days of Mayaguez, writes:   
At 7:29 A.M., the very minute United States Marines were seizing his 
ship, and Gerald Ford was being informed by Henry Kissinger of Phnom 
Penh’s intent to release it anyway, the captain and crew of the Mayaguez 
                                                 
3 United States Department of Defense News Release.  “MIA Marines Identified from the Mayaguez 
Incident.” http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2000/b05182000_bt260-00.html.   
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were setting out in a fishing boat from the Cambodian shore—a fact which 
would have amazed the president, the secretary of state, and all the 
Marines fighting and dying on Koh Tang.4 
By applying select concepts of organizational theory, this thesis concludes the 
GAO report was incomplete in analysis and consequently formed the basis for learning 
the wrong lessons.  Unfortunately even today, lessons learned are often generated but 
rarely studied or analyzed before or after issuance.  Faulty information and lack of 
analysis provide for erroneous results and can lead to future failures.  Organizational 
theory provides a new perspective to the Mayaguez incident, producing drastically 
different results and conclusions than previously published material.  In fact, it is possible 
that had President Ford understood or applied some aspect of organizational theory in his 
analysis, he might have prevented the failures experienced by the military and ultimately, 
saved the lives of the men who fought on Koh Tang. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER REVIEW 
This thesis is derived from a project assigned by Dr. Erik Jansen to analyze an 
organization using the principles taught in his graduate classes at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, California.  Dr. John Guilmartin’s book, A Very Short War, served 
as the impetus for the detailed research of the organizations involved in the Mayaguez 
incident and because of recently declassified National Security Council (NSC) minutes, 
the project quickly honed in on decision making at the executive level.  Subsequently, the 
discoveries concluded in the assignment gained the interest of Dr. Guilmartin.  At his 
request, the findings were presented at the Mershon Center at Ohio State University.  
From there, this thesis evolved.      
In addition to Dr. Guilmartin’s book, several others were accessed in researching 
the incident.  Ralph Wetterhahn’s The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of 
the Vietnam War provided a similar account of the incident but focused more on the 
failure to account for all Marines when exiting Koh Tang Island rather than the executive 
                                                 
4 Rowen, Roy.  The Four Days of the Mayaguez.  New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975. 
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level of operational structure during the incident.5  Another work by Roy Rowan, The 
Four Days of the Mayaguez, provides a historical account of the Mayaguez incident and 
though published in 1975 (the same year in which the incident took place), still offers an 
insightful account of some of the executive-level problems.  Finally, Christopher Lamb’s 
Belief Systems and Decision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis offered an expanse of 
researched aimed directly at the executive level of the Mayaguez incident.  His approach, 
while also based on concepts within organizational theory, varies from the premise of this 
work.  The supposition that President Ford either consciously or subconsciously altered 
the structure of the organization by essentially becoming the sole actor within the 
strategic apex is unique to this thesis.  Again, this is largely due to the application of 
diverse concepts that fall under the umbrella of organizational theory.   
Besides authored books, a diverse collection of government and military 
resources were accessed.  The Marines publication on military command and control,  
memorandums issued during the incident, the GAO report, and NSC minutes were all 
researched in detail.  The GAO report, when coupled with the recently declassified NSC 
minutes, revealed information not previously published in other accounts of the 
Mayaguez incident with the exception of one.  Brian Kelly’s documentary released in 
2000, Seized at Sea: Situation Critical (The Story of the Mayaguez Incident), cited some 
of the references in the NSC minutes, relating them directly to executive-level decisions.  
However, while the account is compelling, it only exposes the decisions and still does not 
address the reasons behind the failures at the executive level.  Particularly valuable to this 
thesis, however, are Mr. Kelly’s interviews of former President Ford, then Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, and then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.    
In addition to the interviews supplied by Mr. Kelly’s documentary and Dr. 
Guilmartin himself, other participants were also consulted.  Colonel (Ret.) Jim Davis, 
ground commander of the Marines during the incident; then First Lieutenant Bob Blough, 
a HH-53 pilot during the rescue, and Dr. Guilmartin all provided insight gained over the 
                                                 
5 It should be noted Dr. Guilmartin found discrepancies in Mr. Wetterhahn’s facts, leading Dr. 
Guilmartin to question Mr. Wetterhahn’s account of the Marines left behind.  In interviews conducted with 
Dr. Guilmartin during the trip to Ohio State University, November 12-14, 2006, he refuted some of the 
facts in Mr. Wetterhahn’s book because of his personal involvement in the events cited.   
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years since the incident.  Additionally, electronic mail was received from then Second 
Lieutenant Dan Hoffman, Marine ground troop who provided a first-hand account of the 
heavy ground fighting on Koh Tang as well as Larry Barnett, also part of the Marine 
assault force who provided yet another perspective of the ground account.  While 
strongly opinionated, the interviews helped examine the frames through which 
participants viewed the event.  Although the thesis ultimately focuses on the executive-
level, specifically President Ford, the interviews were compelling accounts of how 
influential the concepts of frames of reference are in the body of organizational theory.   
Because there is no single, unified organizational theory but rather a vast number 
of complementary, and sometimes competing, theories, much research was accomplished 
to determine those most applicable to the analysis of the Mayaguez incident.  It was 
determined the most relevant works in organizational theory for this particular analysis 
are Henry Mintzberg’s structure in fives theory and Larry Bolman and Terrence Deal’s 
work on frames.  The structural theory easily dominated the research done on the 
organization because of particular importance to the thesis is the structure itself.  
Mintzberg’s discussion of coordination mechanisms and communication within the 
organization helped to define areas of failure previously not addressed by the GAO 
reports.  Bolman and Deal’s work on frames was especially critical to understanding the 
failures caused by executive-level decision making.  By combining the two concepts 
within organizational theory, the proposal that President Ford became the sole member of 
the strategic apex which resulted in a changed and ineffective organizational structure 
was developed.  Simply applying organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident 
demonstrates the decision processes at the executive level left the military operation 
vulnerable to failure. 
 
D. CHAPTER REVIEW 
In Chapter I, the basic story of the Mayaguez was revealed.  In Chapter II, the 
thesis provides a review of organizational theory and discusses key concepts of 
configuration and frames.  In Chapter III, Mintzberg’s structural theory is applied to the 
executive level actors in the Mayaguez incident and in Chapter IV, application of 
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Bowman and Deal’s frames theory further reveals problems in the executive-level 
decision making.  In Chapter V, the findings are consolidated and the true value of the 
critical analysis of executive-level decisions is revealed.   The thesis concludes with 
Chapter VI and provides implications and recommendations for future study.  Finally, 
appendices of the NSC minutes, the GAO report, and other works serve to enhance the 
analysis achieved.  
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
The goal of this chapter is to introduce key concepts and terms that are used in the 
analysis of the Mayaguez incident.  The published lessons learned from this incident, 
while important, were produced with little or no analysis.6  The major thrust of this 
chapter is derived from Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal’s book, Reframing Organizations 
and from Henry Mintzberg, a noted authority among organizational theorists.  Both 
approaches have synthesized a diverse body of organizational theory and while they are 
not the only approaches, they were most revealing in analyzing the Mayaguez incident.  
Bolman and Deal’s model of framing is used to define what frames represent, 
how they are derived, and their value in analysis.  Secondly, frames can be used to better 
understand organizations and the decisions made by their leaders.  Using the frames 
presented by Bolman and Deal, Mintzberg’s models of organizational structure are 
interlaced to develop the critical analyses, especially within the structural frame. 
 
B. FRAMES 
“As a mental map, a frame is a set of ideas or assumptions you carry in your head.  
It helps you understand and negotiate a particular territory.  The territory isn’t necessarily 
defined by geography.”7  People develop frames to conduct everyday life.  Some are built 
subconsciously while others involve a deliberate process.  Framing is a way to sort 
through large volumes of information expeditiously, enabling a decision maker to discern 
important information from merely peripheral details.  It is a way to sort and classify 
information into distinct categories, thereby resulting in a frame.  Because it is often a 
personal perspective when sorting the information, the frame sometimes implies values 
for judging a situation.  Different people who observe the same situation may actually 
frame it differently based on their personal perspectives and prior experiences.  The 
message is, “what looks reasonable, or ridiculous, depends on the context— on how it is 
                                                 
6 See Appendix D 
7 Bolman, Larry G. and Terrence E. Deal.  Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and 
Leadership.  3rd Ed.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003, 12. 
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framed [by] what has preceded it and the language used to present it.”8  Regardless of the 
perspective, the goal of framing is to organize information. 
Bolman and Deal provide organizational frames of reference to assist in 
understanding organizations as open systems and make it easier to navigate among the 
complexity of the organization.  To achieve this, they have categorized different 
disciplines into four frames: Structural, Human Resource, Political, and Symbolic.9   
Each of these frames emphasizes the perspective associated with a major discipline such 
as sociology, psychology, political science and anthropology.  By categorizing the 
disciplines, multiple approaches to organizational theory can be packaged into frames 
that hold concepts more easily applied to organizations.  In the case of the Mayaguez, 
frames would have provided multiple perspectives of the problem at hand for President 
Ford and his staff. 
A key part of the application process with the four frames is the understanding 
that each frame has specific strengths and weaknesses associated with it.  Just like any 
common mechanical tool, understanding which tool is needed and appreciating the 
capabilities of that tool is necessary.  For example, one can use a hammer to drive in a 
screw, but a screwdriver would probably produce much better results, especially in the 
long term.  In addition, Bolman and Deal’s four frames are meant to be multiplicative in 
nature.  “Effective managers need multiple tools, the skill to use each of them, and the 
wisdom to match frames to situations.”10  Balancing the tools should always be an 
objective for any manager dealing with a complex problem.  President Ford’s limited 
international experience as a naval officer likely produced a different frame through 
which he viewed the Mayaguez incident than that of his Secretary of State, Henry 




                                                 
8 Pfeffer, Jeffrey.  Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations. Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press, 1992, 190. 
9 Bolman and Deal, 14-15. 
10 Ibid., 18.   
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C. STRUCTURAL FRAME 
With its roots in “sociology and management science, the structural frame 
emphasizes goals, specialized roles, and formal relationships.”11  Military members are 
keenly aware of this frame because members are trained to understand their formal 
organizational chart and their chain of command.  “The organizational structure 
determines where formal power and authority are located.”12  Every individual is 
assigned a role and is required to understand their responsibilities and tasks.  In addition 
every move a service member makes is governed by rules, regulations, policies and 
procedures.  To this end, “the best structure is the one that helps the organizations 
achieve its strategy” and utilize its resources efficiently.13  This belief takes into account 
six assumptions that Bolman and Deal identify as forming the structural frame 
foundation:14 
• Organizations exist to achieve established goals and objectives. 
• Organizations increase efficiency and enhance performance through 
specializations and a clear division of labor. 
• Appropriate forms of coordination and control ensure that diverse efforts of 
individuals and units mesh. 
• Organizations work best when rationality prevails over personal preferences 
and extraneous pressures. 
• Structures must be designed to fit an organization’s circumstances (including 
its goals, technology, workforce, and environment). 
• Problems and performance gaps arise from structural deficiencies and can be 
remedied through analysis and restructuring. 
 
Scanning through this list, it is apparent that the focus is on the needs of the 
organization and not the individual worker.  In the military, although leadership works to 
mitigate risks, there is often a requirement to put the needs of the mission and the state 
above the individual member. 
Bolman and Deal state that organizational structure is a blueprint for establishing 
formal roles and expectations; it defines internal and external interactions of the 
                                                 
11 Bolman and Deal, 14. 
12 Galbraith, Jay R., Diane Downey and Amy Kates. Designing Dynamic Organizations: A Hands on 
Guide for Leaders at All Levels.  New York: American Management Association, 2002, 3. 
13 Galbraith, Downey and Kates. 60. 
14 Bolman and Deal, 45. 
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organization and its members.  In addition, this blueprint can be designed in numerous 
ways and should consider such forces as the environment, job specialization, 
coordination mechanisms and control measures.  The factors that influence organizational 
architecture are better explained by Henry Mintzberg’s extensive work in the area of 
structural configurations.15  This work is based on Mintzberg’s Structure in Fives and is 
used as the basis of analysis within the structural frame. 
 
D. MINTZBERG’S STRUCTURE IN FIVES 
In Mintzberg’s Structure of Fives, there are five types of organizations: Simple 
Structure, Machine Bureaucracy, Professional Bureaucracy, Divisionalized Form, and 
Adhocracy.  All organizations consist of five components: the Strategic Apex, Middle 
Line, Technostructure, Support Staff, and Operating Core.  For each part to 
communicate, organizations use some or all of the five coordination mechanisms to 
synchronize the differentiated components within the organization: Direct Supervision, 
Standardization of Work Processes, Standardization of Skills, Standardization of Outputs, 
and Mutual Adjustment.  Mintzberg’s five-sector diagram depicted below shows the 
major components of an organizational configuration and includes the Operating Core, 
















                                                 
15 Mintzberg, Henry. “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”  Harvard Business Review, January-
February (1981): 1–16. 







Figure 1.   Mintzberg’s Structure in Fives 
 
 
These five parts describe organizational structures and how the organization may 
cope with its “environment, workforce, technology, and past structural commitments.”17 
It is necessary to define each of the five parts to understand how they fit into the 
organizational structure and how they interact with one another.  How the components fit 
and interact can determine the type of structure, and the inverse is also true: the type of 
structure can determine how the components fit and interact.  Table 1 shows the 
relationship between the type of organization, the dominant parts, and the dominate 
mechanisms according to Mintzberg in his “Organization: Fashion or Fit” article.18 
                                                 
17 Bolman and Deal, 72.   
18 Mintzberg, Henry. “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”, 6 
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Table 1.  Structure, Coordinating Mechanism, and Dominant Part 
Structure Type Primary Coordinating 
Mechanism 
Dominant Part 
Simple structure Direct supervision Strategic apex 
Machine bureaucracy Standardization of work Technostructure 
Professional bureaucracy Standardization of skills Operating core 
Divisionalized form Standardization of outputs Middle line 
Adhocracy Mutual adjustment Support staff 
 
 
First, the operating core consists of the main workforce, which consists of those 
hired to perform the “basic work of the organization”.19  In the Mayaguez incident, this 
would be the tactical elements tasked to execute the operation.  Second, and above the 
operating core is the middle line, comprised of managers who supervise, control, and 
provide resources for the operators.20  For the operation, the middle line consisted of 
units such as the Commander in Chief of Pacific Fleet and his Air Force counterpart 
commanders, essentially the military leadership of the DoD.  The highest level of the 
structure is the senior management or the strategic apex; they are focused on the 
environment, the mission, and shaping the grand design of the organization.21  In the 
Mayaguez operation, this consisted of the National Command Authority.  The last two 
parts sit adjacent to the middle line and are the technostructure and support staff.  For the 
Mayaguez incident, intelligence and logistical units filled these roles.  The 
technostructure consists of specialists and professionals who standardize, measure, and 
inspect processes.22  Examples of the technostructure are accounting departments, quality 
control, and standardization functions.  Finally, the support staff performs indirect 
services that facilitate the work getting accomplished by all others in the organization.   
                                                 
19 Ibid., 3 
20 Bolman and Deal, 73. 
21 Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”, 3.   
22 Ibid. 
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According to Mintzberg, the five types of organizations are dominated by a 
coordination mechanism.  Martinez and Jarillo (1989) assessed research collected on 
coordination mechanisms used by multinational corporations. They define a coordination 
mechanism as, "any administrative tool for achieving integration among different units 
within an organization."23  Mintzberg’s coordination mechanisms within the 
organizational structure are: direct supervision, standardization of work processes, 
standardization of skills, standardization of outputs, and mutual adjustment.   
Mintzberg describes the organizational environment in terms of stability and 
complexity.  In a stable environment, change happens slowly.  By contrast, an unstable or 
turbulent environment requires quick response from an organization to maintain its 
competitive edge.  The environment of the organization can vary in complexity: the more 
complex, the more difficult it is for management to direct the organization leading to the 
need for decentralization.24  Complexity describes the task that must be accomplished to 
generate the organization’s product.  (Producing a hamburger at McDonald’s is a 
relatively simple task, where as a highly trained surgeon must execute complex tasks to 
perform an effective surgery.) 
The way an organization communicates and operates relies on centralization or 
decentralization.  Each method, particularly in decision making, affects the outcome of 
the structural design.  Mintzberg describes vertical decentralization as "the extent to 
which decision making is delegated to managers down the middle line, while horizontal 
decentralization describes the extent to which non-managers . . . control decision 
processes."25  The degree of vertical, horizontal, or any combination of the two types of 
decentralization will affect the coordination mechanism by which the structure is 
dominated by.  Mintzberg’s Fives is more easily understood by reviewing the following 
diagram: 
                                                 
23 Martinez, J. Carlos, and Jon. C. Jarillo.  “The evolution of research on coordinationmechanisms in 
multinational research.”  Journal of International Business Studies, 1989: 489–514, 490. 
24 Mintzberg, “Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit?”, 16. 
25 Ibid., 15. 
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Figure 2.   Mintzberg’s Structure in Fives 
 
The first of the five configurations is the Simple Structure.  This configuration has 
two levels that include the strategic apex and operating core.  This is typical of a start-up 
or small entrepreneurial company (commonly called “mom-and-pop” company) and it 
uses direct supervision by the strategic apex as its coordination mechanism.  Its main 
strength is its capability to maneuver quickly in an unstable environment since the size is 
relatively small.  In contrast, a limitation of the simple structure is the neglect of long-
term strategy if the strategic apex gets too involved in the company’s day-to-day 
activities. 
The second of the five configurations is the Machine Bureaucracy, which is 
dominated by the technostructure.  It standardizes the work processes as its coordination 
mechanism.  This works because of the simple nature of the tasks and the stable 
organizational environment.  In many ways this is the classic organizational structure, 
most commonly represented by businesses based on standard operating procedures (such 
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as McDonald’s).  These organizations have many levels of hierarchy topped by the 
strategic apex, which is concerned with long-term strategies, middle management 
working local level actions, and the operating core performing simple and repetitive tasks 
of producing food for customers.  This setup allows the business to gain efficiency from 
the bureaucratic structure and puts the technostructure at the forefront since they are 
charged with standardizing processes and inspecting their performance.  Because the 
work at the operator level is simple and often mundane, motivation is sometimes 
problematic. 
The third of the five configurations is the Professional Bureaucracy.  This 
configuration has a large operating core and usually has few managerial levels between 
the strategic apex and the operating core.  University or law offices are two examples of 
this configuration.  The primary coordination mechanism is the standardization of skills 
since most of the operating core is highly trained prior to entering the organization and 
each individual within the organization feels a certain amount of motivation to meet 
professional standards.  These highly trained individuals execute complex tasks in a 
stable environment.  This configuration creates some unique challenges.  The operating 
core, because its individuals are highly specialized, can become isolated from the other 
parts of the organization.  This causes difficulty in assessing quality control and also 
responding to a rapidly changing environment.  “The result is a paradox:  individual 
professionals may be at the forefront of their specialty, while the institutions as a whole 
changes at a glacial pace.”26  
The fourth of the five configurations is the Divisionalized Form.  This 
configuration is characterized by a company like General Motors or a multi-specialty 
hospital with the middle line manager at the forefront of the organization.  Because these 
organizations have diversified product lines, they can operate in moderately unstable 
environments and complete tasks that range from simple to complex.  As a result, they 
use standardization of products as the coordination mechanism.  It is readily evident that 
this configuration can be extremely difficult to manage effectively from the view of the 
strategic apex.  The benefits to this configuration are much like a mutual fund in that 
                                                 
26 Bolman and Deal, 77. 
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diversity can reduce risk and the company can benefit from ample resources.  Some 
problem areas include competition between divisions or with the corporate headquarters.  
In addition, headquarters may find it difficult to stay in touch with all divisions and 
therefore must trust its division leaders to ensure success.  However, this is the favored, 
or established, structural form of the United States military.  As in the Mayaguez 
incident, communication through multiple layers in the divisionalized form is no easy 
accomplishment. 
The fifth of the five configurations is Adhocracy.  This “is a loose, flexible, self-
renewing organic form tied together mostly through lateral means.”27  Examples include 
"think tanks" and advertising agencies that exist in turbulent environments requiring 
extreme flexibility.  The support staff is the focal point of the organization and the 
primary coordination mechanism is mutual adjustment.28  Mutual adjustment is a type of 
freewheeling and allows highly creative people to interact under an umbrella of 
ambiguity.  The end result would likely be positive exploration that yields benefits to the 
organization.  These organizations can survive in unstable environments that require 
complex tasks to be executed.  A problem can arise if external pressures push them to 
formalize.  If the environment requires them to be more formalized or standardized, the 
organization may not survive as it exists and may need to reconfigure which can cost the 
organization its workforce. 
Mintzberg’s Structure of Fives revealed structural problems as well as faulty 
coordination mechanisms between the parts of the organization involved in the Mayaguez 
incident.  The predominant problem, however, was the strategic apex and its interaction 
with the remainder of the organization.  This is further discussed in Chapter III. 
 
E. HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME 
This frame emphasizes the study of psychological perspective of work.  It views 
an organization as a large, extended family.29  In contrast to the structural frame that 
                                                 
27 Bolman and Deal, 77. 
28 Mintzberg, “Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit?”, 4. 
29 Bolman and Deal, 14. 
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focused on the organization as a rational system of roles, the human resource frame sees 
many individuals who possess needs, emotions, capabilities and limitations.  As a result, 
organizations and managers need to understand people and work to create a symbiotic 
relationship between workers and their work place.  This linkage is further defined by the 
human resource frames core assumptions:30 
• Organizations exist to serve human needs rather than the reverse. 
• People and organizations need each other.  Organizations need ideas, energy, and 
talent; people need careers, salaries, and opportunities. 
• When the fit between individual and system is poor, one or both suffer.  
Individuals are exploited or exploit the organizations—or both become victims. 
• A good fit benefits both.  Individuals find meaningful and satisfying work, and 
organizations get the talent and energy they need to succeed. 
 
The human resource frame is useful for analyzing often non-quantifiable human factors 
that affect the organization.   
Three of the four core assumptions deal directly with establishing a true symbiotic 
relationship between the individual and the organization. Achieving this balance satisfies 
all parties and meets the needs of the individual while keeping the organization on track 
to succeed.  A symbiotic balance such as this appears in nature between many animals 
and makes life better for each animal as a result.  This is the goal of the human resource 
frame.  However, a common problem is organizations are sometimes built with inherent 
conflict because an improper configuration exists from the start.  This results in the needs 
of the individual not being met.  Chris Argyris observed this conflict because the 
structure and method of management did not meet the needs of the individuals.31  In 
addition, Argyris believed many organizations treated individuals like children and did 
not realize people have basic self-actualization tendencies.  This mismatch of people and 
the organization must be understood and properly identified by management to reduce 
possible conflict.   
To build and implement a strong human resource philosophy, Bolman and Deal 
provide some overall guidance and practices that should assist in achieving harmony 
                                                 
30 Bolman and Deal, 115. 
31 Argyris, Chris.  Integrating the Individual and the Organization, 32. 
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between individuals and the organization.  The human resource table below summarizes 
the principles that should be part of any successful human resource strategy:32   
Table 2. Human Resource Principles and Practices.  
Human Resource Principle Specific Practices 
Build and Implement a Human Resource 
Management Strategy 
Develop a Shared Philosophy for 
Managing People 
Build Systems/Practices to Implement 
Philosophy 
Hire the Right People Know What You Want and Be selective 
Keep Them Reward Well and Protect Jobs 
Promote from Within and Share the Wealth 
Invest in Them Invest in Learning 
Create Development Opportunities 
Empower Them Provide Information and Support 
Encourage Autonomy and Participation 
Redesign Work and Foster Self-Managing 
Teams 
Promote Egalitarianism 
Promote Diversity Be Explicit and Consistent about the 
Organization's Delivery Philosophy 
Hold Managers Accountable 
 
 
After reviewing the table, it is clear an organization must first commit to manage 
with human resources and nurture that relationship. A successful outcome would be 
reciprocation by the individuals to perform at their highest capability.  In short, take care 
of the people's needs and they will take care of the organizational needs.  In the 
Mayaguez incident, providing intelligence likely would have fostered confidence in the 
leadership dictating the operation.  Because it was not provided or it was inaccurate if 
provided, this alienated the operators from the leadership.  The operators no longer felt 
the keys to their success were supported at the executive level.  Though the military is 
known for its fortitude and adaptability, President Ford’s decision to combine units that 
had never worked together in a mission none of the units had attempted was extremely 
risky.  Though one might think this conveyed utmost confidence in the troops by the 
                                                 
32 Bolman and Deal, 136. 
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executive level, it actually had the opposite effect as the troops felt they were operating in 
a vacuum, “left to fend for themselves.”33 
 
F. POLITICAL FRAME 
This frame, derived from political science, views an organization as a jungle or 
arena with a struggle for power and competition over scarce resources.  The formation of 
coalitions is key and techniques such as bargaining, negotiation, coercion, and 
compromise are included in everyday activities.  “Commitment . . . suggests that we can 
build alliances by getting others to do favors for us.”34  Favors typically lead to 
commitments which then lead to coalitions, as seen in government politics.  This frame is 
typically represented by governmental structure.  As issues arise, the sponsors of 
legislation work vigorously to build coalitions that support their position.  During this 
process, individuals may try to leverage any power or influence they possess to develop 
support to attain resources to achieve their goals.  This political process is said to be 
inevitable in any organization and managers need to understand how to use this frame to 
better understand their organization. 
Bolman and Deal list five propositions to summarize the complex web of 
interactions between individuals and group interest:35 
• Organizations are coalitions of diverse individuals and interest groups. 
• There are enduring differences among coalition members in values, beliefs, 
information, interests, and perceptions of reality. 
• Most important decisions involve allocating scarce resources—who gets what. 
• Scarce resources and enduring differences make conflict central to organizational 
dynamics and underline power as the most important asset. 
• Goals and decisions emerge from bargaining, negotiation, and jockeying for 
position among competing stakeholders. 
 
The Department of Defense (DoD) exemplifies the above propositions.  Each 
service component represents a coalition with special operations cutting across the 
services with its own coalition.  Each coalition or group has unique interests such as 
                                                 
33 Col. (Ret.) James Davis, Interview with authors, August 30, 2005. 
34 Pfeffer, Jeffrey.  Managing with Power, 198. 
35 Bolman and Deal, 186. 
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purchasing land-based equipment versus modernizing airframes.  As each group jockeys 
for position, they defend their need to receive funding or the scarce resources of the DoD.  
When one party perceives another party is preventing attainment of its goals, conflict 
arises.  “Each party forms its own interpretation of the situation,” commonly referred to 
as conceptualization or framing.36  Persons who have served in the Pentagon can attest to 
the conflicts that develop as resources are allocated to each group.  On occasion, the joint 
process of acquisition or a political civilian leader may affect the decision process via 
negotiations, prioritization or are trumped by civilian use of power. 
A key influence in the political frame is power.  Each organization has a unique 
power distribution or lack thereof in some cases.  According to Dr. Jeffrey Pfeffer, power 
is “the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome 
resistance, and to get people to do things they would not otherwise do."37  Power in an 
organization is the ability to get things accomplished.  This power can be derived from a 
coalition or an authority figure in the organization.  Bolman and Deal list eight sources of 
power that have been derived by multiple sources:  Position Power (authority), 
Information and Expertise, Control of Rewards, Coercive Power, Alliances and 
Networks, Access and Control of Agendas, Framing, and Personal Power.38  Those who 
formally do not possess power in the organization or who exist at lower levels can use 
many of these power sources to overcome their position of disadvantage.  Even when in a 
formal position of authority, one may find they do not possess the necessary power or 
influence to accomplish the job.  John Kotter, a noted leadership expert, calls this a 
"power gap" and suggests that using the above list of power sources to close this gap as a 
manager.39 
Power often can often be a source of conflict within an organization.  Many 
people fear conflict or feel it is a negative, but this is not entirely true.  Florence Heffron 
                                                 
36 Heffron, Florence A. Organization Theory and Public Organizations: The Political Connection.  
NJ:Apprentice Hall, 1989, 184. 
37  Pfeffer, Jeffrey.  Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations. Boston, MA: 
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38 Ibid., 195–6. 
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states, "Conflict has benefits as well as costs. . . .  Conflict challenges the status quo and 
stimulates interest and curiosity.  It is the root of personal and social change, creativity, 
and innovation."40  The real challenge in organizations is to properly manage this 
conflict.  Poorly managed conflict brings negative outcomes to the organization instead 
of stimulating innovation and growth.  Bolman and Deal identify key boundaries or 
interfaces, such as departments or levels in organizations as the most likely source of 
conflict.  Congress and the NSC are naturally at odds (and thus, create a boundary) when 
it comes to military operations.  Congress wants to be informed of every detail while the 
NSC requires the operational details be closely guarded. 
Managers who seek to understand the political frame must be able to identify 
these areas of conflict and create the right environment allowing a positive outcome.  
Furthermore, their position alone will more than likely fail to provide the overarching 
power they expect.  Instead, managers have to draw from the power sources listed by 
Bolman and Deal if they are to get the job done or effect the change they desire.  
President Ford, eager to prove himself worthy of the presidential position, likely was 
heavily influenced by the political frame.  Combined with the symbolic frame, powerful 
influences affected his decisions during the Mayaguez incident. 
 
G. SYMBOLIC FRAME 
The symbolic frame draws on social and cultural anthropology and views 
organizations as tribes or theaters.41  The symbolic frame minimizes rationality and 
explains organizations in terms of cultures that are ripe in "rituals, ceremonies, stories, 
heroes, and myths than by rules, policies, and managerial authority."42  Organizations 
may also be viewed as theaters where actors play specific roles in an organizational 
drama.  "Problems arise when actors blow their parts, when symbols lose their meaning, 
or when ceremonies and rituals lose their potency."  Furthermore, the use of symbols, 
myths, and magic may be used to rebuild lost spirit in the organization.  A leader can 
influence an organization merely through his actions as he is a symbol of how to act, how                                                  
40 Heffron, Florence A. Organization Theory and Public Organizations, 185. 
41 Bolman and Deal, p 15. 
42 Ibid., 15. 
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to dress, or how to lead.  Symbolism works because they “appeal less to reason and more 
to [emotion].”43  The objective of the symbolic frame is to understand how symbols in 
organizations become so powerful. 
As mentioned in previous sections, frames are used to better package 
multidiscipline approaches to provide better understanding to a manager.  The symbolic 
frame pulls from many resources and provides the following core assumptions:44  
• What is most important is not what happens but what it means. 
• Activity and meaning are loosely coupled; events have multiple meanings because 
people interpret experience differently. 
• In the face of widespread uncertainty and ambiguity, people create symbols to 
resolve confusion, increase predictability, find direction, and anchor hope and 
faith. 
• Many events and processes are more important for what is expressed than what is 
produced.  They form a cultural tapestry of secular myths, heroes and heroines, 
rituals, ceremonies, and stories that help people find purpose and passion in their 
personal and work lives. 
• Culture is the glue that holds an organization together and unites people around 
shared values and beliefs. 
 
In the symbolic frame, perhaps the most significant assumption is that of culture 
and the effect it has on the organization.  For this reason, culture is often synonymous 
with symbolic when using the frames approach to organizational theory.  It is also 
representative of a more contemporary approach to organizational theory than that of 
traditional topics such as rational actors and objectivity.  The importance of culture to an 
organization is profound.  Culture can dictate every aspect of an organization to include 
its actions and outputs and the culture of the organization can also alter the individual’s 
actions.  “Culture both a product and a process.”45  “Symbols are powerful indicators of 
organizational dynamics” and “acquire meaning in the organization through recurring 
experiences.”46  Managers who understand the impact of culture and symbols on an 
organization can better apply their leadership and operate the organization effectively.   
                                                 
43Kotter, John P.  Power and Influence, 91. 
44 Ibid., 242. 
45 Bolman and Deal, 243. 
46 Wilderom, Celeste P.M., Mark Peterson, and Neal Ashkanasy, eds.  Handbook of Organizational 
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Symbols can simplify, clarify, and bring together an organization under even the 
most confusing of circumstance or environment.47  “Symbolism not only affects how 
people perceive events, but it also influences actions.”48  For instance, the feeling the 
American flag imposes on a person ranges from freedom to simple patriotism, but most 
notably, it unifies them under a single movement acting in concert tied to emotion.  
(McDonald’s golden arches unify all individual franchises under the umbrella of a single 
organization whether domestically or internationally located.)  Symbols can range from 
myths, ceremonies, superheroes, to simple graphics such as Superman’s “S”.  The use of 
symbols is so powerful that often in problem organizations, simply introducing an 
effective symbol for individuals to relate to can unify previously deeply divided 
components.  The symbolic frame “offers powerful insight into fundamental issues of 
meaning and belief and possibilities for bonding people into a cohesive group with a 
shared mission.”49  President Ford did not perceive the strong influence upon him of the 
symbology of America as a weak superpower.  Though he was aware he needed to 
improve America’s image both domestically and internationally, he did not understand 
how this frame likely narrowed his perception of events, thereby making his decisions 
faulty. 
Frames provide the leadership with a means to gather, process, and sort 
information critical to the organization’s success.  In the Mayaguez incident, President 
Ford’s frames of reference dramatically affected and hastened the process of decision 
making.  He felt political pressure because of the way he came into the presidency.  He 
subverted the human resource frame by assuming the military could overcome shortages 
and inexperience. He felt pressured by the symbology of America as a weakened 
superpower.  If the president had understood the effects framing and structure can have 
on decision making, it might have enabled him to include more information or allow 
more time to process the decision of an air assault campaign with an ill-equipped 
organization.  
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III. MINTZBERG’S STRUCTURE IN FIVES 
Examining the Mayaguez Incident through the structural frame using Henry 
Mintzberg’s theory of structural configuration provides one of many approaches to 
understanding the event.  Mintzberg’s theory, as described in Chapter II, describes how 
an organization fits within the context of the organization’s environment and the 
organization’s tasks.  Success occurs when the organizational structure, decision 
authority, and coordination mechanisms match the environment and tasks.   
In this document, the focus is on the strategic apex and how the chief decision 
maker’s actions affected the structure and coordinating mechanisms of the organization.  
These changes in structure and coordinating mechanisms had a vital impact on the 
outcome of the military’s mission. 
 
A. DIVISIONALIZED FORM 
The executive level of the United States government and the DoD most closely 
resembles Mintzberg’s divisional form.  In this structure, a single strategic apex controls 
multiple middle lines, each with their own specialized task.  The president and close 
advisors (Cabinet members, Whitehouse staff) form the strategic apex and DoD makes up 
one of the substructures within divisionalized form.  The Department of Defense, led by 
the Secretary of Defense and member of the NSC, has its own multiple divisions whose 
middle line managers include Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) and service 
chiefs.  As discussed in Chapter II, the middle line directs the dominant mode of 
coordination, which is standardization of outputs.   
The requirement for standardization of outputs is for the strategic apex to 
uniformly compare outputs of multiple organizations within the divisionalized structure.  
Standardization of outputs in a business context can be accomplished by comparing the 
net worth of separate divisions within the organization.50  For the military, the output to 
be standardized is the ability for the division to utilize its resources to achieve its mission 
objective with acceptable losses.  
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Each separate middle line manager is responsible for the personnel below him and 
is responsible for the outputs of his or her division (see Figure 3).  Success of the 
organization relies somewhat on the autonomy of the division heads.51  Prior to execution 
of hostilities in the Mayaguez incident, the middle line consisted of CINCPAC 
(Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command), PACFLEET (Pacific Command Fleet), and 
PACAF (Commander, Pacific Command Air Force)52.  Later, due to the actions of the 
president, the middle line was replaced by members of the strategic apex, rendering the 
established middle line ineffective.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Mintzberg’s Divisionalized Form 
 
 
The strategic apex, with the president at the top, began in the traditional form as 
the NSC.  The output sought by the strategic apex was an effective armed assault to 
recover the SS Mayaguez and her crew.  The organization’s ability to conduct the 
operation was severely hampered, however, when the president overstepped his 
boundaries within the strategic apex.  It is unknown whether this was a conscious or 
subconscious maneuver, but nonetheless it is an obvious action as evidenced in the NSC 
                                                 
51 Mintzberg, “Organization Design Fashion or Fit?”, 9. 
52 See Appendix G, CINCPAC Command Relationships. 
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minutes following the incident.53  Again, the thesis focuses on examining the actions of 
the strategic apex throughout the ordeal, where the greatest insight into the failures of the 
operation is revealed.  
The divisionalized structure works especially well for the armed forces.  Each 
military specialty can organize, train and equip under a single chain of command.  Air 
combat, ground combat and sea combat forces specialize to become effective in their 
individual arenas.  The military can somewhat control the training situation or at least 
choose favorable timing for their training, creating a somewhat stable environment.  The 
military in a training environment also can define the task or problem and attempt to keep 
the task from becoming too complex.  When the environment is complex, training allows 
for timelines to be adjusted to allow for development of effective coordinating 
mechanisms.  The result is a structure that passes directives from senior leaders to the 
middle line managers who implement them within their division to achieve a certain 
capability or output. 
The Divisional Form can hold different types of structures from division to 
division within the overall organization.  This design allows flexibility within the 
organization yet retains rigidity amongst the individual parts.  For example, the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Marines all have flexibility in how they conduct operations but they 
are unyielding in how they use the chain of command.  Some divisions, such as logistics 
units, are highly specialized and highly formalized much like a machine bureaucracy.  
Other divisions, such as task forces, are highly specialized and highly trained with little 
formalization.  They are much like a professional bureaucracy, where the operators are 
given a goal and expected to provide a solution based on their training.54  Hence, DoD 
operates as a divisionalized form consisting of a mixture of structures. 
During wartime, DoD’s typically conventional approach involves application of 
vast resources over a specified amount of time prior to an engagement.  The 
divisionalized structure remains intact, allowing its leadership to rely on an established 
command and communication lines previously utilized and practiced in training.   
                                                 
53 See all appendices of the National Security Council Minutes, May 12–15, 1975. 
54 Mintzberg, “Organization Design Fashion or Fit?”, 6. 
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B. STRUCTURAL FORM DURING THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT 
In peacetime, the military practices its job under coordination mechanisms that 
are structured to accomplish both complex and simple tasks in a relatively stable 
environment.  During wartime or contingency operations, however, forces are normally 
detached from their organizing, training and equipping chains of command and realigned 
under a GCC.    The intent of rearranging the command lines is to match the operating 
core of combat forces to a middle line whose focus is on applying combat power.  The 
new chain of command additionally includes a large number of mission planners, 
intelligence specialists and personnel familiar with the area of operations.  These 
specialists make up the support staff that is in place to aid the assigned combat force.  
The GCC is built to provide regional expertise and situational awareness.   
Organizations use horizontal coordinating mechanisms to address complexity and 
instability.  The operating core is empowered to “fuse experts drawn from different 
specialties into smoothly functioning, creative teams.”55  Organizations also use mutual 
adjustment through support staffs to deal with a complex task in an unstable environment.  
For the Mayaguez incident, the GCC that should have facilitated horizontal coordination 
and mutual adjustment was Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC).  
Unfortunately, CINCPAC did not fulfill this role because the president and his staff 
bypassed the middle line and directly supervised portions of the mission.  This affected 
all operations, to include communications between the units.  The units directly involved 
in the action needed to coordinate their movements, resupply, fire support, close air 
support and extraction but were not able to speak to each other due to the fact that each of 
the separate functions did not know what radio frequency the other units were using.56  
While this is not the fault of the executive level, it is resultant of the fact that the middle 
line was bypassed, so standard methods for coordinating communication were never 
executed.  Mutual adjustment and horizontal coordination mechanisms are difficult to 
build during an operation if the support structure is disengaged. 
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56 Dan Hoffman, e-mail message to authors, August 30, 2005. 
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Figure 4.   Mintzberg’s Divisionalized Form During the Mayaguez Incident (ideal) 
 
In some organizations, the way things are supposed to happen and the way they 
are executed are often not similar.  Influences from other factors such as leadership, 
politics and external pressures can sway the organization away from its formally designed 
structure.  During the Mayaguez incident, President Ford consolidated power at the 
strategic apex.  Mintzberg notes that consolidation of power at the strategic apex is 
normal during periods of hostility.57  But while consolidation is normal, this 
strengthening of power had far-reaching effects, changing the structure of the 
organization and mission execution. 
The strategic apex in the United States military chain of command normally 
includes the president, vice president, director of the CIA, and secretaries of state and 
defense; however, based on the declassified NSC meeting minutes, President Ford 
specified his role as the sole decision maker.58  This relegated the vice president, 
secretary of state, and director of the CIA to administrative functions, in effect placing 
them squarely in the middle line.  The National Military Command Center (NMCC) 
shifted to the technostructure and became the conduit through which planning and 
                                                 
57 Mintzberg, “Organization Design Fashion or Fit?”, 5. 
58 National Security Council Memorandum for the Record.  Wednesday, May 14, 1975, 6:40pm-
8:00pm.  Gerald Ford Library. 
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standards for mission execution bypassed the organization.  The SECDEF and CJCS also 
became part of the middle line, which already included the Local Command.  In the 
beginning, the Local Command had direct control over the operating core—the units 
tasked with mission execution, USS Coral Sea, USS Holt, Boarding Party, Koh Tang 
Marine Assault Force, 41st Rescue and Recovery Wing, the tactical fighters, and 56th 
Special Operations Wing.  As time progressed, the strategic apex centralized his power 
causing the middle line to grow and become ineffective.  The original middle line— 
PACOM and its support staff— were demoted to an administrative staff role as well. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Mintzberg’s Divisionalized Form During the Mayaguez Incident (in 
practice) 
 
By forcing the middle line to take administrative staff roles, the president 
alienated those who were normally authorized to take action.  This broke down the ability 
for the units involved to secure resources from their normal middle line support 
structures.  With the president controlling the participants directly from the Whitehouse, 
the middle managers could not engage their support staffs to assist the assault force 
operating core. 
The CINCPAC support staff was needed in the Mayaguez Operation to deal with 
the situational and organizational complexity.  The Marine assault force needed a way to 
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order resources and coordinate with the other units involved in the operation to include 
the helicopter squadron from the Air Force and the air support from both the Navy and 
the Air Force.  When multiple requests for intelligence photos were denied or made 
unavailable essentially because the middle line had been bypassed, Col. (Ret.) James 
Davis, a Marine company commander who took his troops to Koh Tang Island, 
personally flew in a light observation aircraft with a handheld camera to get intelligence 
photos of the island before the attack.  Because of altitude constraints, however, his 
photographs were of limited use.  As he and his troops were preparing for takeoff aboard 
the running helicopters, he was finally handed the reconnaissance photographs he had 
requested much earlier.  The photographs showed there were anti-aircraft weapons and 
large troop concentrations on the island that the assault force was totally unaware of until 
that point.59  This greatly increased the risk and complexity of the mission. 
Simple structures and vertical mechanisms of control work sufficiently well when 
there are simple tasks in an unstable environment, but complex tasks in an unstable 
environment often fail under the uncomplicated configuration.  As in the Law of 
Requisite Variety, “the greater the variety within a system, the greater its ability to reduce 
variety in its environment through regulation.”60  In consolidating power, President Ford 
shifted the organization to look more like a simple rather than complex structure, similar 
to an autocracy.61  A single decision maker, wielding the power to change and direct the 
workforce can have immediate impact on outputs.  In the case of the Mayaguez, the 
output should have been an effective military operation to recover the ship and crew.  
However, the impact of President Ford’s consolidation of power reduced the 
effectiveness to the point of output failure.  The support staffs were essentially cut out of 
the designed structure.  Figure 6 below shows Mintzberg’s simple structure or autocracy. 
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Figure 6.   Mintzberg’s Simple Structure or Autocracy 
 
The weakness with a simple structure or autocracy is “. . . that when the CEO 
becomes . . . so wedded to his strategy that he cannot perceive the need to change it, the 
very survival of the organization becomes threatened.”62  In a complex environment a 
single leader cannot filter and process such massive amounts of information.  Cultural 
factors for the Khmer Rouge, diplomatic factors, military capabilities and processes all 
flooding in within a short time period could not be accurately sorted by a single person.  
This was further amplified because that same person was preoccupied with relaying 
direct, tactical decisions to the operating core.  In one case, President Ford spoke by radio 
directly with a fighter pilot flying over the waters near Cambodia.63  This shows the 
incredible level that direct supervision was being used.   
Direct supervision—the coordinating mechanisms during the final stages of the 
operation—was without any connectivity to the established organization.  This was 
evident in every survivor interview; each stated they did not speak to one another but 
relied on the fact that things just happened and each component would do its job.  
Fortunately, the nature of the military is to be flexible and adaptive.  In the case of the 
Mayaguez, it was the operating core that functioned as a well-trained team—mutually 
adjusting and deploying their skills in spite of the remainder of the organization.  Of 
course, it functioned as a matter of survival rather than a matter of effective 
organizational structure. 
                                                 
62 Mintzberg, Henry.  Power In and Around Organizations, 358. 
63 Seized at Sea: Situation Critical: The Story of the Mayaguez Crisis.  DVD.  Produced, directed, and 
written by Brian Kelly. Alexandria, VA: Henninger Productions, 2000. 
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President Ford should have forwarded his objectives through the NSC to the 
middle line, which in turn, should have been conveyed to the operating core.  (Need 
quote here about the importance of transmitting the organization’s goal to the lowest 
levels.)  Furthermore, the middle line should have been afforded the authority to act 
autonomously to achieve the organizational goal.  In a divisionalized form, the “key 
assumption is that if the division managers are to be responsible for the performance of 
their divisions, they must have considerable autonomy to manage them as they see fit.  
Hence there is extensive delegation of authority from headquarters to the level of division 
manager.”64 
The essential organizational structures were in place at the onset of the Mayaguez 
incident but the president consolidated power in his own position at the strategic apex, 
thereby pushing down the Secretary of Defense to the middle line and relegating the true 
middle line to more of an administrative function.  The simple structure he created did 
not fit in the complex environment.  The operating core was left without an effective 
support staff and paid the price in casualties.  President Ford’s consolidation of power at 
the strategic apex may have been a response to perceived hostility but was likely also 
precipitated by other factors discussed in the frames chapter. 
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IV. FRAMES 
The difficult task when analyzing organizations and the actions of their leaders is 
choosing the correct frame(s) in which to view the occurrence or situation.  In order to 
achieve the desired results of the organizational process, a suitable level of understanding 
is required when selecting the frame(s) through which to view an event.  Bolman and 
Deal offer four interpretations (Structural, Human Resource, Political and Symbolic) of 
the frames analysis to facilitate selection of relevant frames.  As previously discussed, 
frames are lenses through which observation is conducted in order to gain perspective 
and/or understanding of actions and responses.   
In this chapter, analysis of the Mayaguez incident is concentrated at the executive 
level to help understand the democratic decision-making process at the strategic apex.  
Using the frames analysis will foster a larger perspective of a specific event in an 
extremely difficult and complex environment.  Inappropriately framing an event or 
situation places the decision maker in a precarious situation with a low degree of fidelity.  
Additionally, trying to comprehend the exigency of the situation and choosing the correct 
frame can be extremely difficult.   
Trying to match the correct frame to a particular situation can be demanding and 
can require an intricate understanding of the process.  “For a given time and situation, 
one perspective may be more helpful than others.  At a strategic crossroads, a rational 
process focused on gathering and analyzing information may be more helpful.”65  
Selecting the perspective—or frame—is the art of framing and reframing situations to 
understand the meaning.  To alleviate the confusion amongst the frames and cope with 
the uncertainty of deciding between them, Bolman and Deal developed a model for 
choosing the correct frame at the correct point in time.  Table 3 poses questions to 
facilitate analysis and suggests the conditions under which a particular frame is likely to 
be most effective.  In the case of the Mayaguez incident, framing and reframing the event 
using the table helps reduce ambiguity and bring together the analysis.  The focal point of  
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the frames analysis is the NSC and their individual commitment to the crisis, the 
technical quality of the decisions, degree of understanding, and the resources available 
for the operation.  
Table 3. Choosing a Frame 
 
YES    NO 
Is individual commitment 






Is the technical quality of 
the decision important? 
Structural Human Resource 
Political 
Symbolic 
Is there a high level of 


















Several lines of recent research find that effective leaders and effective 
organizations rely on multiple frames.  “[Leaders] can use frames as scenarios . . . to 
generate alternative approaches to challenging circumstances.”66  Using a frame, one can 
focus on a moment in time, a scene, or a set of ideas.  Framing and reframing are a set of 
skills employed to one degree or another by the leader.    
The essential tool of any manager is the ability to frame, particularly in a large, 
diversified or divisionalized structure.  Using frames, a leader can make sense of a 
situation, subject, or object as well as judge its character and relative significance.  In 
applying frames, a leader applies a particular meaning to the topic at hand.  We define 
meaning when we ascertain that our interpretation is as valid as any other possible 
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interpretation.67  Even when frames are applied (consciously or subconsciously), people 
are inclined to use one frame over another to interpret a situation sometimes failing to 
make accurate or complete assessment of a situation.  Knowledge of the frames approach 
should alert the leader to the importance of applying all possible frames in order to 
leverage the best possible solution.   
For example, in a scenario in which employee morale is poor, the human relations 
frame might have more significance than the structural frame.  “Rather than reorganize 
and restructure to improve production or conditions, it is likely more important to 
discover what is truly affecting the employees and include them in the process”.68  In the 
case of the Mayaguez, the structural frame was, at best, faulty.  Although the brave men 
of the Mayaguez incident pulled the mission together with guts and determination, the 
organizational structure was highly suspicious from its inception.  It was critical that the 
president use multiple frames of reference to view the situation through different 
perspectives.  Using this approach, he would have likely made decisions based on more 
robust and properly contextualized information and then subsequently, develop an 
organization that could accomplish the mission.   
 
A. THE STRUCTURAL FRAME 
As discussed in Chapter III, the organization became powerless as President Ford 
assumed the entire function of the NSC.  By reserving sole decision-making authority, he 
removed a capable organization with a high degree of experience and hindered their 
ability to participate in the process.  It is important to note that by assuming all decision-
making capability, President Ford changed the structure of the organization, remaining 
alone atop the strategic apex.  The president, feeling pressure from his environment, 
perceived an urgent need to move quickly to rescue the Mayaguez and her crew.  He 
consolidated authority at the presidential level bypassing the middle line and senior staff, 
which limited the organization’s ability to plan and organize effectively.   
                                                 
67Fairhurst, Gail T., and Robert A. Sarr.  The Art of Framing: Managing the Language of Leadership.  
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996, 22. 
68 National Defense University.  Strategic Leadership and Decision Making.  
http://www.au.af.mil/au/aw.  Accessed April 1, 2006. 
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The major challenge for the president was to lead a large, complex set of activities 
and set goals under conditions of uncertainty.69  While addressing the NSC, President 
Ford avouched, “as Commander-in-Chief, I have the right to use military force . . . and 
regardless of the 1973 law,70 I have the authority to take action.”71  President Ford’s 
perceived need to act decisively and quickly further exacerbated the complexity of the 
task and the instability of the environment in which the NSC was operating.  Viewed 
through the structural frame, President Ford subconsciously changed the architecture of 
the organization and acting as the sole strategic apex member, he came to believe he was 
entitled to full and singular decision-making authority.  
 
B. THE HUMAN RESOURCE FRAME 
“The human resource frame emphasizes an understanding of people, their 
strengths and weaknesses, reasons and emotions, desires and fears.”72  According to 
Kotter, a challenge of leadership is to “motivate, coordinate, and control a large group of 
subordinates.”73  Additionally, the human resource frame purports an existing strong 
linkage between the needs of the employee, the alignment of individual and 
organizational needs, interpersonal and group dynamics, and management approaches.  A 
poor fit between the organization and its employees leads to ineffective performance.74  
In the case of the Mayaguez, the principles of the human resource frame were non-
existent.  Organizations exist to serve human needs.75 
In an effort to bring the president’s staff and organization in synchronization, 
Ford provided his vision of short and long-term goals and direction to rally his 
National Security Council (NSC).  President Ford specified three objectives in the 
                                                 
69  Kotter, John P.  The General Managers.  New York: Free Press, 1982, 20. 
70  President Ford is referring to the War Powers Act of 1973 that states the President shall consult 
with Congress before introducing Armed Forces into hostilities. 
71  National Security Council Memorandum for the Record.  Wednesday, May 14, 1975, 6:40pm-
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72  Bolman and Deal, 18. 
73 Kotter, The General Managers, 21. 
74 Bolman and Deal, 115. 
75 Ibid., 115. 
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Mayaguez crisis: “first, to recover the ship and crew; second to avoid the possibility 
of hostage negotiations; and third, to mount a demonstrative use of U.S. force to 
bolters America’s international credibility.”76  The plan was to overwhelm a weaker 
enemy with superior force and rescue the hostages with lightning-fast precision.  
However, there were two human resource problems working against the president 
during the Mayaguez.   
The first problem was the National Security Council and their devolving 
capability to influence the operation.  The members of the NSC were operating under an 
extremely compressed timeline, and the president wanted quick results.  Although 
President Ford hired competent and qualified people to serve on his staff, he failed to 
empower them and encourage autonomy to solve the Mayaguez crisis.  If the staff had 
been empowered, they may have developed a more complete strategy with a shared 
philosophy, overcoming the narrow focus of the president.  Additionally, including more 
personnel in the process might have produced alternative options not yet considered by 
President Ford.  As seen in the NSC minutes in Appendix E, the president often stifled 
other suggestions made by members of the NSC to fulfill his interest in attacking the 
Cambodian mainland.  When a president decides to exert his powers as Commander-in-
Chief, he naturally interferes with standard operating procedures.77 
The second failure within the human resource frame was President Ford’s 
inability to manage the organizational conditions so that the people involved with the 
crisis could achieve their own goals and facilitate resolution of the incident.78  “[Their] 
talent will be wasted if the structure, processes, and metrics dissipate their energy and  
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create barriers to their collective effectiveness.”79  Centralizing all decision-making 
capability around him, President Ford essentially made managing the armed forces 
executing the rescue impossible.   
By consolidating control, the president failed to allow the organization to function 
properly and achieve the correct mix of personnel for the job.  Instead, he forced the hand 
of his middle line causing a violation of what Bolman and Deal call the Human Resource 
Principle, “hire the right people, be selective, and encourage autonomy and 
participation.”80  The soldiers chosen for the operation were those who were immediately 
available, not specifically trained or organized for the task at hand.  The Marines were 
only six months out of boot camp and did not see any action in Vietnam; however, the 
Air Force enlisted flight crews were highly experienced (Telephone interview with 
Marine Ground Commander Colonel (Ret.) Jim Davis, August 29, 2005).  The Air Force 
helicopters were comprised of few special operations helicopters but predominately a 
rescue unit that had never accomplished or even practiced an air assault prior to the 
Mayaguez crisis.  In fact, because the raid on Son Tay still was classified at the time of 
the incident, no unit in the Air Force had officially planned or accomplished an air assault 
mission.81  
 
C. THE POLITICAL FRAME 
“The political frame [references] organizations as competitive arenas 
characterized by scarce resources, competing interests, and struggles for power and 
advantage.”82  It is within this frame that decision making becomes an opportunity to 
gain or exercise power, to resolve conflict, and realign power if necessary.  Because 
power, coalition, and conflict make up the core of the political frame, negative images 
usually come to mind when addressing politics.  However, viewed through this frame, 
politics is simply the realistic process of making decisions and allocating resources in a 
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context of scarcity and divergent interest.  The challenge for President Ford during the 
Mayaguez operation was the scarcity of resources (limited number of trained military 
personnel and funding), diverging interests (selecting a diplomatic or military option) and 
proving himself as a worthy world leader. 
President Gerald Ford assumed the Presidency in August of 1974 under 
extraordinary circumstances.  He was the first vice president chosen under the terms of 
the 25th Amendment having been nominated by then President Richard Nixon to replace 
the resigned Vice President Spiro Agnew.  When President Nixon resigned, it opened the 
door for Vice President Ford to assume the presidency.  Not popularly elected to the 
office, it is possible President Ford felt a need to legitimize his actions and power.  The 
Mayaguez incident was an excellent opportunity to restore the face of America after the 
Vietnam War via the hand of President Ford.  However, the Mayaguez incident presented 
the president with an immediate challenge to his power base: Cambodia.  
The Khmer Rouge regime achieved infamy by massacring millions through 
execution, starvation and forced labor.  It was one of the most violent governments of the 
20th century often compared to Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong.  For this 
reason, the United States refused to legitimize the government of Cambodia and, 
therefore, was reluctant to address them via diplomatic channels.  President Ford strongly 
opposed direct contact with Cambodia to avoid giving credence to a brutal, communist 
government.  Because he would not send a request for release of the Mayaguez and her 
crew directly to the Cambodian government, President Ford needed to build an 
international coalition to address the problem.  China was available as a mediator for the 
incident, but the United States’ treatment of Vietnamese citizens during the war 
dissuaded the Chinese from forging ties with the U.S. government.  The U.S. issued a 
formal request to Cambodia through the Chinese demanding the release of the hostages; 
however, the Chinese Embassy refused to accept the message.  After the incident—the 
U.S. discovered that the Chinese only verbally conveyed the message to Cambodia, but to 
what extent and reception is unknown.83 
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Another critical link in the international coalition was Thailand.  The government 
of Thailand had made it known that if the United States intended to invade or conduct 
hostile acts against Cambodia over the Mayaguez, it would formally request removal of 
all American military troops.  In the NSC minutes, President Ford acknowledged the Thai 
government would likely be upset at any U.S. military action against Cambodia, but that 
the Thais would be “reassured.”84  Failing to believe that the Thai government would 
follow through with its threat to demand the removal of American troops, President Ford 
again failed to forge a much-needed link in the international coalition.  Using the 
international arena within the context of the political frame, President Ford could have 
realigned power from military to diplomatic channels, thereby relieving diverging 
interests and provide for safe return of the Mayaguez and crew. 
Another critical aspect of the political frame is conflict.  Because time was 
severely compressed and possibly because of President Ford’s perceived need of proven 
legitimacy, conflict was relatively non-existent.  Normally, conflict between the political 
bodies of the Department of Defense and the Department of State would be readily 
evident when the NSC considers military action.  However, because President Ford had 
filled his staff with key supporters and because time was severely limited (by the 
president), the opportunity for conflict was initially reduced.  One would think less 
conflict is healthy but according to Heffron, conflict is a necessary function within an 
organization.  It “encourages new ideas and approaches to problems, stimulating 
innovation.”85  At one point during the NSC meeting over the Mayaguez crisis, Donald 
Rumsfeld, then Chief of Staff at the White House, said to President Ford, “From the 
political standpoint, we should get your friends and brief them, so that they can stand up 
for you.”86  This is a prime example of the president’s efforts to limit conflict by 
surrounding himself with supporters to his cause. 
President Ford sent troops into harm’s way without a complete understanding 
of the situation in Koh Tang.  President Ford had previously briefed congress on 
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issues concerning Vietnam and the fall of Saigon in accordance with the War Powers 
Act.87  During the Mayaguez incident however, President Ford felt he needed to use 
his presidential might to work outside the limits of the Act.  This created turmoil 
amongst his staff and the Congress.  Officially, Congress sent a response to the 
president through White House spokesman Robert Hartman that demanded 
consultation as required by the War Powers Act.88  
 
D. THE SYMBOLIC FRAME 
“The symbolic frame focuses on issues of meaning and [interpretation].  It puts 
ritual, ceremony, story, play, and culture at the heart of organizational life.”89  Within the 
symbolic frame, it is necessary for a leader to develop and convey “credible strategic 
premises, identify and focus on core activities” and find the meaning behind the task at 
hand.90  President Ford, while he developed credible strategy, failed to focus the 
organization on core activities to discover the purpose of the Cambodian seizure of the SS 
Mayaguez.  Cambodia, in a long-standing war with Vietnam, had stationed combat-
hardened troops on the island of Koh Tang to prevent its takeover from Vietnam.  The 
Cambodians deemed the U.S. merchant ship SS Mayaguez a threat to the island because 
they feared the United States had sided with Vietnam.  This story was unknown to the 
NSC and president and, if known, drastically would have altered the choices made at all 
levels of the organization— particularly the strategic apex that selected military action. 
Meaning and interpretation are core components of the symbolic frame.  The 
Vietnam War had just ended and the public viewed DoD, military, and administration as 
incompetent and fallible.  The Vietnam War created a need to regain the public’s trust 
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and confidence because the administration’s ability to conduct and supervise war was 
non-existent.  The Department of Defense wanted a chance to prove they could conduct 
successful operations and although the Mayaguez rescue was a small operation it became 
an avenue of great hope.  The administration sought to alter the perception of the United 
States in the international arena by executing a swift, decisive military operation to bring 
home the Mayaguez and her crew.  The success of this mission would immediately 
produce 39 heroes (the number of Mayaguez crew) for the American public to rally 
around.  Looming in the back of their minds, however, was the previously unsuccessful 
attempt at hostage rescue on the USS Pueblo. 
The USS Pueblo was a United States Navy vessel sent on an intelligence mission 
off the coast of North Korea.  On January 23, 1968, North Korean naval vessels and MiG 
jets attacked the USS Pueblo, resulting in one soldier killed and several wounded in 
action.  Subsequently, for the next eleven months, the eighty-two surviving crewmembers 
lived as captives in North Korea.  After a series of military and diplomatic blunders by 
the United States, the North Koreans eventually released the USS Pueblo crew on their 
own accord.  This event was a source of great embarrassment to the nation and still fresh 
in President Ford’s mind, serving as an example of how the impact of an event can affect 
organizational perspective: the USS Pueblo became a symbol.  Often times, this frame 
compels an organization to constantly search for its identity creating a need to draft 
another tale favorable in the public eye.   
The people of the United States no longer felt the country was the great 
superpower it claimed to be.  Globally the nation was perceived as weak and often 
deemed incapable of fulfilling its role as leader of the free world.  President Ford felt that 
if America did not act quickly and decisively during the Mayaguez crisis and with 
sufficient force, it would confirm to Russia, North Korea, and China the United States 
was vulnerable to defeat.  The symbology of a weak America was not acceptable or even 
believable to President Ford.  It was inconceivable America could be anything but a 
symbol of great power and stature to Americans, but the rest of the world was starting to 
think otherwise.  Both the USS Pueblo incident and the Vietnam War combined to 
threaten America’s standing in world politics.   
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Since the Vietnam War ended only two weeks earlier, those involved in the 
Mayaguez crises seem to face insurmountable odds.  Even the American military 
experienced feelings of tremendous defeat.  Casualty numbers were unmentionable and 
often ambiguous, leading to further depleted levels of morale within the military.  The 
culture within DoD and its political counterparts had become one of survival rather than 
domination.  A great need emerged for the military to prove itself to not only the world, 
but to the American public and time would be of the essence in creating the new story by 
which to form the symbolic frame. 
In reviewing the four frames of Bolman and Deal’s frames of reference—
structural, human resource, political, and symbolic—as well as Mintzberg’s structure, the 
analysis of the Mayaguez incident is made clearer but still lacks full clarity.  Other 
influences outside the applications of organizational theory can dramatically alter or 
influence the decisions of the executive level as well as the organization as a whole.  
However, in the Mayaguez incident, these influences do not change the thesis that 
President Ford altered the organizational structure by acting as the sole member of the 
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V. FINDINGS 
The Mayaguez incident, in terms of applied concepts of organizational theory, 
revealed many findings, the most predominant of which was the singularized form of the 
strategic apex.  As previously stated, the traditional definition of the strategic apex is top 
management, meaning a body of persons collectively managing the organization.  In the 
case of the United States government, top management (Mintzberg’s strategic apex) is 
traditionally thought of as the NSC and the president.  In simple organizations, the 
strategic apex is typically comprised of only one individual because the size of the 
organization is limited in terms of available personnel.  In an organization the size of the 
United States government with a multitude of qualified and available personnel, it is not 
likely the strategic apex could operate successfully as a single individual.  Additionally it 
is expected the organization, if it attempts to operate as such, will fail or as a minimum 
become ineffective.  However, during the Mayaguez incident, the strategic apex quickly 
became a single person—the president.  This thesis proposes the reason behind the 
failures encountered during the Mayaguez incident was that the organization, traditionally 
divisionalized, attempted to operate as a simple structure with the president as its sole 
actor in the strategic apex.  
As previously stated, in a simple structure the dominant coordinating mechanism 
between the strategic apex and the remainder of the organization is based on direct 
supervision.  In the divisionalized form (e.g. the government structure), the coordinating 
mechanism is standardization of outputs and the middle line accomplishes this by 
formalization—a task that cannot be created in a compressed timeline.  During the 
Mayaguez operation, the president became focused on military action and gave little 
credence to other ideas proposed by the rest of the NSC.  In effect, this isolated him as 
the sole decision maker who attempted to control the organization through direct 
supervision.  This was exemplified by his direct contact with the fighter pilots (operating 
core) firing upon the vessels in the waters off of Cambodia.  
By directing the fighter pilots, president Ford derailed established coordination 
mechanisms from the NSC down to the operating core, completely bypassing the middle 
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line.  This made the ability to accomplish or assign tasks difficult or in some cases, not 
possible, because established standard operating procedures normally executed by the 
middle line were circumvented.  This further fueled the president’s perception that he 
needed to directly intervene.  According to Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, the 
notion of one man leading a massive government and making decisions unilaterally is 
said to be an oversimplification of any national government.91  Instead, a leader or 
“decision-maker” of national policy works as a joint member of a network that includes 
large organizations and multiple political actors.  This argument is logical when the scope 
of a national government is matched with its dynamic environment.  The task of 
collecting all the relevant information and possessing the needed expertise to make 
effective decisions as an individual seems unreachable.  To add to the complexity, the 
president’s actions were further affected by a phenomenon attributable to frames. 
Normally, the Department of State and the Department of Defense have different 
frames through which they observe world events and possible responses.  Instead of 
opposing one another in their framework, the Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, 
and the Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, were in agreement for a proposed 
solution.  Kissinger was known as a proponent of hard line foreign policy, often 
recommending military action in place of diplomatic action.  Even when diplomatic 
action was the solution, it was associated with the possibility that decisive force would 
follow should the foreign body in question not comply.  “Kissinger was emphatic on the 
use of force [in the Mayaguez incident].”92  Collectively, their frames of reference 
complimented one another instead of providing opposing viewpoints for more 
comprehensively developed courses of action.  “In a complex and uncertain world, senior 
managers can’t be expected to always choose the alternative that in hindsight produces 
the best outcome.  But good senior managers can be expected to ensure that . . . complex 
decisions are evaluated through a variety of alternative frames.”93 
                                                 
91 Allison, Graham & Philip Zelikow.  Essence of Decision Making: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.  2nd Ed.  New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc., 1999, 3.   
92 Rowen, Roy.  The Four Days of the Mayaguez.  New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975, 141. 
93 Russo, J. Edward and Paul J.H. Schoemaker.  Decision Traps: Ten Barriers to Brilliant Decision-
Making and How to Overcome Them.  New York: Doubleday, 1989, 58. 
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Reviewing the declassified documents shows the lack of fidelity President Ford 
possessed during this incident.  The information pertaining to the threats on the island, 
the intentions of the Khmer Rouge, the location of the hostages, and the capabilities of 
the ad-hoc military forces severely impacted the capability of the president to possess 
enough situational awareness to act appropriately.  The ability to collect both critical and 
timely information to make an effective decision is greatly influenced by those 
individuals directly surrounding the decision-maker as well as his preferences.  This need 
for information highlights the necessity to develop and maintain clear channels of 
coordination in the organization.  Effectively using the coordination mechanism(s) allows 
the decision-maker to stay well-informed.  In the Mayaguez incident, President Ford not 
only chose to operate as the sole decision-maker, he also acted with limited situational 
awareness as events unfolded in the Mayaguez incident. 
The middle line, especially in a divisionalized form, is traditionally most aware of 
the situation and most able to discern appropriate responses.  Because President Ford 
essentially bypassed the middle line and thus the center of knowledge, he denied himself 
the situational awareness required for effective decision making.  For example, the CIA 
was aware of the ongoing conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia over Koh Tang Island 
—a critical piece of information that might have led President Ford to explore a greater 
number of diplomatic channels rather than commit troops to a heavily fortified island.  “. 
. . U.S. intelligence had a sound grasp of Khmer Rouge tactical capabilities on Koh 
Tang.” 94  This vital piece of information might well have changed the entire outcome. 
In addition to errors within the structure and the limited frames of reference 
through which President Ford viewed the initial Mayaguez recovery problem, several 
outside factors may have influenced his framing and decision making effort.  Time and 
technology were determined to be the most significant outside influences that added to 
the complex environment in which President Ford operated.  For example, though the 
situation at hand in the Mayaguez incident was complex, it was manageable until 
President Ford applied inordinate time constraints.  This reduced the ability to separate 
the task of retrieving the crew from the perceived need for urgent military action.   
                                                 
94 Guilmartin, John F., Jr. A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang.  College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995, 36. 
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Time constraints—real or supposed—often cause conflict and pressure.  
Richard Nixon accurately observed that the American public would only allow a 
finite amount of time to accomplish a mission, something President Ford remembered 
well.95  With Vietnam, the USS Pueblo, anti-war sentiment and deep concern for how 
the American public would view his actions, President Ford centralized the power 
and held all decision-making authority in the interest of saving time.  However, his 
quick decisions were at the expense of planning, preparation, organization and human 
lives.  If the Khmer Rouge moved the crew to mainland Cambodia, President Ford 
and his cabinet felt they would not be able to negotiate for their release.  President 
Ford, in Rowan’s book states, “I had to assume that if this fishing boat, with those 
crew member, got ashore, that the odds were against us in getting them back.”96  The 
Khmer Rouge did in fact transfer the crew to mainland Cambodia; however, they 
released them before first helicopter ever landed at Koh Tang Island.   
Intelligence is critical to foreign operations as they often occur at great 
distances from the leadership in Washington, D.C.  In the case of the Mayaguez, 
though the technology for intelligence was there, the outputs from that community 
were not routed through the proper channels.  The military force obtained photos only 
seconds before takeoff and was unable to use the information given effectively.  
According to Bob Blough, the intelligence personnel assigned to the assault force 
were from the B-52 community—strategically focused rather than tactically oriented 
—and incapable of using the technology to their advantage.  The photos and 
information required for a helicopter pilot flying below 5,000 feet was dramatically 
different than that of a B-52 pilot flying at 35,000 feet.  Technology was not only a 
critical factor for the operating forces, but also for the president. 
President Ford’s ability to bypass the organization and reach directly to the 
operating core was directly enabled by technology.  Through the radio connection 
established in the NMCC (National Military Command Center), he spoke directly 
several times to fighter pilots and the Airborne Command and Control Center during 
the strafing of the Cambodian waters.  It is also likely that if the radio frequencies of 
                                                 
95 Borer, Douglas. The Clock is Ticking in Iraq, San Francisco Chronicle, October 7, 2005 
96 Rowan, Four Days of Mayaguez, 143. 
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the assault force were known by the NMCC, he would have attempted contact with 
those participants as well.  Though this seems advantageous, it is actually destructive 
in established divisionalized structures.  The strategic apex should not have direct 
contact with the operating core as the apex lacks both the situational awareness and 
knowledge required for controlling the core’s outputs.  The middle line is critical to 
military operations, particularly in complex environments such as the Mayaguez 
incident.  President Ford, eager to speak directly to the troops, completely changed 
the organizational structure and technology was the enabler. 
Advancement of technology, while required and necessary, must be 
appreciated in the context in which it is used.  Though President Ford’s direct 
discussion with the troops seems an obvious mistake in the Mayaguez incident, it is 
unfortunately still common in today’s military.  In Robert’s Ridge, for example, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke directly to the MH-47 pilots executing 
an operation under fire in Afghanistan (personal interview with a participating MH-
47 pilot, Captain Al Mack, USA, conducted May 2003), overriding the orders upon 
which the mission was executed.  In fact, the orders were changing as the mission 
progressed and Secretary Rumsfeld directed the situation.  The already dire situation 
was further complicated and the end result was unnecessary loss of life.  Whether 
attributable in part or directly, the technology meant to provide perspective to the 
senior staff was causal to the accident because of misapplication by the strategic apex.   
Time and technology, both outlying but influential factors in the Mayaguez 
incident, added to the complex environment.  President Ford, unable to successfully 
navigate the complex environment, made decisions to execute based on incomplete 
and sometimes inaccurate information.  Had the president not isolated himself as the 
single actor in the strategic apex, he may have found the complex environment more 
simple and straightforward.  The frames of reference through which he attempted 
decision making were unfinished and often erroneous perspectives that limited his 
ability to execute effective action.  Application of organizational theory to the 
Mayaguez incident demonstrates the decision processes at the executive level left the 
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY AND CONCLUSION  
Much can be learned from the Mayaguez incident using organizational theory as 
an analytical tool.  The Mayaguez crisis was rife with potential pitfalls and though 
President Ford was equipped with an excellent organization of intelligent, competent 
personnel, the result was unnecessary loss of life.  Sacrificing 41 military personnel for 
the recovery of 39 crewmembers is a major statement in terms of political and military 
objectives, despite the military responsibility of defending American lives no matter the 
cost.  To the public, the operation was a success and President Ford the savior of the 
Mayaguez crew.  To the military, the operation was an embarrassment of windfall 
proportions.  What had begun as a major air assault operation had turned into a quest for 
survival—all because of failures within the organizational structure and poor decisions 
made through inappropriate or incomplete frames of reference.  The magnitude of irony 
in the operation is unprecedented—even before the first shot was fired on the island of 
Koh Tang, the SS Mayaguez and her crew had been released.  Had President Ford 
understood or applied even a single concept of organizational theory in his analysis of the 
situation, it would have provided the necessary perspective for critical decision making, 
saved lost lives, and prevented men being left behind.    
 
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Two areas of future study would enhance the proposal that application of the 
concepts within organizational theory serve to enhance analysis of lessons learned, 
specifically in the military or governmental environment.  The first is to scrutinize the 
way in which information is gathered and analyzed for lessons learned.  Contact with 
Joint Center for Operational Analysis to understand their process should be the starting 
point for further examination.  The second area of future study is the development of a 
“tool” (e.g., checklist, flow diagram) for organizations to analyze their output and 
coordination mechanisms as well as structure.  These two areas of study would greatly 
enhance the accuracy of lessons learned for organizations. 
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Proposal 1:  Further examination of how lessons learned are analyzed is 
required to improve the resultant solutions.  
The Mayaguez incident, while a single operation in the military’s history, is 
stereotypical of how many operations occur.  Because there is a predictable way military 
operations occur, there must be a way to alter or improve their actions.  Yet the military 
has repeated the mistakes not only in the Mayaguez but also in operations prior to and 
after the Mayaguez incident, despite an entire center for lessons learned being established 
at the United States Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia.  Named the Joint Center 
for Operational Analysis (JCOA), it exists to produce “compelling recommendations to 
change derived from direct observations and sound analysis of current joint operations, 
exercises and experiments.”97  It also maintains a “comprehensive database and archives 
of lessons and documents pertaining to previous and ongoing joint operations around the 
world.”  The irony is that the center was established in 1997—far too late when one 
considers the number of U.S. Military operations executed in the twentieth century.  
Better late than never, the center seeks to unify lessons learned across all services; 
unfortunately joint lessons are rarely analyzed outside of military channels. 
“Failure to consciously define the problem in more ways that one” can lead to 
“undue influence by the frames of others.”98  Once again, the organization (the military 
in this case) views the problems through like-minded frames leading to erroneous or 
incomplete assumptions or actions.  “Establishing the framework within which issues will 
be viewed and decided is often tantamount to determining the result.”99  Therefore, the 
resultant analysis is incomplete or inaccurate.  Not only are the frames through which the 
analysts at JCOA view an operation limited, but the analysis itself is faulty.  According to 
the website, JCOA gathers lessons learned from inputs entered by military members in 
the field.  The center then repeats the mistakes and lessons learned in a war-gaming drill  
 
 
                                                 
97 United States Joint Forces Command.  Joint Center for Operational Analysis. 
http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jcoa.htm.   
98 Russo and Schoemaker.  Decision Traps, 39. 
99 Pfeffer, Jeffrey.  Managing with Power, 203. 
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to produce a solution to the problem submitted.  By using only single-source analysis, 
JCOA is limiting the military’s possibilities for success, making them vulnerable to 
continued failure.   
This thesis, by using concepts outside of the typical military war-game analysis, 
seeks to demonstrate the effectiveness of alternate analytical methods.  Though 
organizational theory is more commonly associated with businesses, it has direct 
application to the military and government structures.  In the case of the Mayaguez, an 
entirely different perspective of failure was achieved by exposing the president as the 
single-actor strategic apex.  Though the president did not fail the operation, his decision 
making exposed the military to unnecessary risk.  If one read only the GAO reports, it 
would be determined the military and in no way, the president, was entirely at fault for 
the mistakes committed.   
War-gaming could include frames of reference as part of the final analysis.  When 
used repetitively, it becomes second nature to view the events through different lenses, 
therefore allowing diverse analyses of the same experience, allowing for a shared 
understanding in a dynamic world.  Organizational theory is not necessarily the answer, 
but it exemplifies the need to apply theories outside of typical military thought to expose 
the true problems and lessons learned in military operations.   
 
Proposal 2:  An organizational theory tool may be effective in alternative 
analysis of military lessons learned. 
As exemplified by JCOA, the military lacks effective tools to properly analyze 
lessons learned.  Instead, the lessons gathered through an online process are consolidated, 
reviewed, and then modeled by a war-game scenario.  The center personnel design the 
game to simulate the same situation the forces were in, and then merely re-enact the event 
applying the lessons learned to “analyze” whether they are credible solutions.  Though re-
enacting the scenario with new material is somewhat effective, it hardly gains much more 
than a hindsight discussion.  Again, the concern is the frame of reference through which 
the analysts examine the event and the organization.  Unfortunately, the organization is 
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rarely analyzed by any perspective other than the war-game.  This thesis exemplifies the 
value of applying other academic theories when analyzing both organizations and events.  
Again, if frames of reference are incorporated, a shared understanding may result. 
Though commanders often are laden with techniques, advice, and theories to take 
to battle, an organizational theory tool to use on the lessons learned may prove effective.  
Though it is not feasible in the heat of battle to pull out a checklist for analysis, it may be 
valuable in post-battle discussions.  More importantly, JCOA would greatly benefit from 
the ability to apply theory rather than simulation or modeling to lessons learned.  Varying 
theoretical perspectives serve to expand knowledge by providing different, even opposing 
views.  As demonstrated in this thesis, application of organizational theory exposed 
organizational failures in the Mayaguez incident rather than simple lessons learned as 
published in the GAO analysis.  
 
B. CONCLUSION 
Applying selected concepts of organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident of 
1975 leads to a more comprehensive understanding of events and more accurate lessons 
learned.  Application of organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident demonstrates the 
decision processes at the executive level left the military operation vulnerable to failure.  
The Mayaguez crisis was rife with potential pitfalls and though President Ford was 
equipped with an excellent organization of intelligent, competent personnel, the result 
was unnecessary loss of life.  Publicly, the operation was a success, however, to the 
military the operation was an embarrassment—all because of failures within the 
organizational structure and poor decision making. Application of the concepts within 
organizational theory facilitate comprehensive analysis rather than elementary lessons 
learned. 
Future study should include both examination of the current process for 
collecting, analyzing, and publishing lessons learned as well as creation of a tool 
organizational leadership can use to analyze their processes, outputs, and design.  It 
should be noted other organizational theorists suggest that while organizations can 
improve their processes and outputs, the improvement is often limited because the 
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organization itself is resistant to change.  Amy Zegart, in Flawed by Design, suggests, 
“Once [government agencies] arise, they become very difficult to change.”100  She 
observes that “the price of initial structural choices appears to be high . . . and 
[organizations] are created by political actors who must operate in a reality suffused with 
conflict, contention, and compromise…”101  Though the theory challenges other theories 
that suggest organizations can change, it is also directly in line with the theory examined 
in this thesis—Bolman and Deal’s framing theory.  Regardless of the organizational 
theory, this thesis suggests application of any theory during analysis will prove more 
productive than current practices in governmental organizations. 
                                                 
100 Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999, 5. 
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APPENDIX C 















































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 73
APPENDIX E 
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